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Resumo
Os Taliban e o Crime Organizado
Desde 2001 que o crime organizado tem tido um 
papel importante na desestabilização do Afega‑
nistão. Este artigo analisa a participação dos 
Taliban afegãos (denominados por Quetta Shura 
Taliban – QST) em actividades criminais no sul e 
sudoeste do país, descrevendo a forma como este 
envolvimento está a ser aprofundado e como o 
grupo interage com organizações independentes 
de contrabandistas.
Mais recentemente começámos a assistir a uma 
erupção da rivalidade associada a disputas por 
uma maior fatia dos lucros, o que gerou vulne‑
rabilidades estruturais profundas nos e entre os 
grupos de insurgentes e de terroristas na zona 
de conflito. A exploração destas rivalidades e o 
fomentar das desconfianças pode ser maximizada 
com vista a degradar o nível de cooperação dos 
militantes limitando seriamente os fundos obtidos 
por estes. No entanto, esta estratégia é arriscada 
pois poderá potenciar o eclodir de uma maior 
violência entre os grupos, aumentando o número 
de baixas civis.
Abstract
Organized crime has played an important destabilizing 
role in post ‑2001 Afghanistan. This article will 
mainly focus on how the Afghan Taliban, commonly 
referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), engage 
in criminal activity in the south and southwest, track 
how their involvement in crime is deepening and 
look at how the group interacts with autonomous 
smuggling organizations. 
More recently we saw an eruption of rivalries over 
criminal profits which appear to have created deep 
structural weaknesses within and between insurgent 
and terror groups in the conflict zone. Exploiting 
those rivalries and breeding distrust could serve to 
degrade levels of militant cooperation and disrupt 
funds reaching militant coffers. This strategy is risky, 
however, to the extent that it could spark internecine 
violence and contribute to an increase in civilian 
casualties.
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Introduction
Militant groups on either side of the Afghanistan/Pakistan frontier function like 
a broad network of criminal gangs, not just in terms of the activities in which they 
engage, but in the way the groups are organized, how funds flow through their 
command chains and how they interact with each other. Within this complex adap-
tive system, criminal profits fund the wider insurgency, while terrorist violence 
helps militants to coerce and exert a level of control over local communities. Within 
a realm of poor governance, widespread state corruption and predation by local 
power brokers, the Taliban and other belligerent groups engage in and protect or-
ganized crime – mainly smuggling, extortion and kidnapping. 
Organized crime helps insurgents across the region to raise funds, and – whether 
by design or by accident – has effectively become a key element of their asymme-
tric warfare campaign, spreading fear and insecurity. crime slows the pace of de-
velopment and frustrates attempts to extend the rule of law and establish a sustai-
nable licit economy. insurgents find ways to justify criminal behavior as part of 
their jihad, claiming, for example, that they live off the alms of the people, or ra-
tionalizing that they deal in drugs in order to make addicts of infidels. As with 
Mafia clans and street gangs operating in the West, illicit insurgent behavior can 
be simultaneously protective and predatory towards the communities where insur-
gent entities operate. This paper will mainly focus on how the Afghan Taliban, 
commonly referred to as the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), engage in criminal activi-
ty in the south and southwest, track how their involvement in crime is deepening 
and look at how the group interacts with autonomous smuggling organizations.1 
it will examine how the code of conduct promulgated by the Taliban in 2009 sou-
ght to limit harm caused to civilians, while also seeking to centralize control of 
illicit revenues. 
The Taliban’s involvement in organized crime broadens the coalition’s security 
challenge. However, the insurgency’s financial reliance on predation also creates a 
strategic liability, limiting the group’s popular appeal and sparking fierce internal 
rivalries. The coalition and the wider community trying to stabilize Afghanistan 
could potentially exploit both these weaknesses, but only in an environment whe-
re the Afghan government was seen as a more reliable alternative. 
Organized crime has played an important destabilizing role in post -2001 Afgha-
nistan. Protecting and taxing the opium trade helped fund the Taliban resurgence, 
 1 Two other factions of the insurgency in Afghanistan are widely referred to as the Haqqani ne-
twork and the Hizb -i -Islami Gulbuddin. This paper focuses only on the Quetta Shura Taliban. 
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and has intensified the conflict in Afghanistan’s south by bringing both militants 
and corrupt state actors significant wealth and access to explosives and weapons. 
Kidnapping, attacks on supply convoys and widespread protection rackets have 
also dramatically increased security and other costs for the coalition, local gover-
nments and international organizations working in the region, slowing the pace of 
development and reconstruction and spreading the perception that the Afghan 
government is weak and ineffective. The cycle of development projects and busi-
nesses that pays protection to insurgents, whom then use the funds to buy explo-
sives and attack coalition troops, creates a moral hazard for the international 
community and contributes to a self -sustaining war. in districts where local com-
munities earn from the opium trade, Taliban protection of illicit commerce can 
elicit various forms of cooperation and support from civilians.
Organized crime also fuels corruption, the single biggest obstacle to stabilizing 
Afghanistan. corrupt state actors not only have a disincentive to improve gover-
nance, they also rob their governments of critical revenue. According to a January 
2010 report by the United nations Office on drugs and crime (UnOdc), Afghans 
paid $2.5 billion in bribes in 2009, equivalent to 23 percent of that country’s GdP. 
critics of the US -led plan to stabilize the region note that anti -corruption efforts 
typically must come from within in order to succeed, a vexing consideration for 
nATO military commanders trying to implement a counterinsurgency (cOin) 
strategy with often -unreliable local partners (Heineman, 2009).
estimates of the Taliban’s annual earnings from narcotics and other organized 
crime vary by hundreds of millions of dollars. Although most analysts agree 
it’s not possible to determine precisely how much the QST earns from opium, 
nor estimate what portion of its total budget comes from narcotics, senior US 
military intelligence officials and members of the Afghan Threat Finance cell, 
an interagency body tracking Taliban finance in Afghanistan and the U.S., be-
lieve the Afghan insurgency is now self -financed and that narcotics represents 
the largest portion of QST funding2. The Taliban profit from the opium trade in 
four main sectors: by taxing poppy farmers 10 percent (ushr) of their farm ou-
tput, by charging fees to protect opium shipments and heroin refineries, by 
taxing and, increasingly, running their own drug labs, and in the form of large 
cash payments made to the Quetta Majlis by major trafficking groups. Of these 
 2 Personal interviews by the author, Washington d.c. and see also: “Afghanistan’s narco -War,” 
a report to the committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, August 10, 2009, p. 14. Available 
at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi -bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_cong_senate_committee_
prints&docid=f:51521.pdf 
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sums, tax collected from the farmers appears to represent the smallest portion 
of the insurgents’ take, and these earnings by and large remain at the village 
level, where sub -commanders often sell off what they collect to local agents in 
order to cover operational costs. The QST also tax licit farm products as well as 
commodities that are traded or trafficked through Afghanistan. insurgents across 
the country earn additional funds from a wide range of protection rackets, 
kidnapping schemes and by protecting smugglers of other “lootable” natural 
resources, mainly timber and gemstones. Organized crime is not the insurgent’s 
only source of income, although most analysts agree that predation and other 
sources of funding bring the insurgents far more than they need to support their 
military operations. 
Though crime brings financial advantages, the associated levels of violence 
caused by insurgents have also prompted growing numbers of civilians to question 
the purported religious, political and ideological motives of the militants. This 
creates an opportunity that the coalition has barely begun to tap. Belligerents on 
both sides of the durand Line have long portrayed themselves as impoverished 
mujahidin, battling under the flag of islam and living off the alms of ordinary civi-
lians who support them. A 2009 statement by the Taliban’s number two, Mullah 
Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was detained in Pakistan in February 2010, expresses 
the typical rhetoric heard from militants on both sides of the frontier: “This pious 
and patriotic people have offered tremendous material and soul sacrifices in the 
way of their sacred objectives. The mujahidin have not chosen this path of strife 
between the truth and the evil to obtain material goals. They have lofty islamic and 
nationalist aims.”3 
Whatever legitimacy such claims may provide, there are growing indications 
that militant involvement in organized crime and high levels of terrorist violence 
have undermined public support, particularly since local communities – virtually 
all of them fellow Muslims – are the main victims. While militants may protect 
illicit economies – and in doing so gain cooperation from community members who 
seek to protect their income source – militants also prey on civilians, both through 
the taxes and protection fees the militants charge and by creating instability that 
hampers the development of licit alternatives. 
Though, members of the local community may at times cooperate with the 
Taliban for economic reasons or out of fear, that cooperation appears not to indica-
te that the QST has been embraced as a popular force. Rather, recent public surveys 
 3 For the full statement see: “Taliban deputy Amir – Obama’s new Strategy,” 30 October 2009. 
Available at http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaAkhund1109.pdf
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indicate that approval ratings for the insurgents are dropping. Some 90 percent of 
Afghans surveyed in a January 2010 ABC/BBC News poll preferred the government 
of President Hamid Karzai to the Taliban – an increase of eight points over a figu-
re provided a year earlier – while 69 percent, a new high, described the insurgents 
as the nation’s greatest threat.4 Some analysts have questioned the high favorabi-
lity rates that the Karzai government earned in the survey, but low and declining 
levels of public support for the insurgents could be tracked across several polls 
taken in 2009 in both Afghanistan and Pakistan (MacKenzie, 2010).5 The Pakistani 
public’s growing hostility towards the militants was also palpable in dozens of 
interviews conducted for this paper. People routinely referred to them as goonda, 
meaning gangster in Urdu, rather than mujahidin, a historically reverential term for 
islamic fighters. 
The nATO coalition – which also remains unpopular – stands to improve re-
lative levels of community support and capitalize on public disgust towards the 
militants by developing strategies to protect civilians victimized by organized 
crime and violence.6 The Afghan government, widely perceived as corrupt, could 
also improve its image by making concrete efforts to stamp out crime and reduce 
corruption. Separately, rivalries over criminal profits appear to have created deep 
structural weaknesses within and between insurgent and terror groups in the con-
flict zone. exploiting those rivalries and breeding distrust could serve to degrade 
levels of militant cooperation and disrupt funds reaching militant coffers. This 
strategy is risky, however, to the extent that it could spark internecine violence and 
contribute to an increase in civilian casualties. 
 4 “Views improve Sharply in Afghanistan, Though criticisms of the US Remain High,” ABC 
News, January 11, 2010. This poll was conducted with the BBc and ARd German TV. Poll results 
can be seen at: http://abcnews.go.com/PollingUnit/afghanistan -abc -news -national -survey-
-poll -show -support/story?id=9511961. 
 5 This article notes that there is little empirical evidence of optimism among many ordinary 
Afghans, suggesting that the numbers could reflect a sense of hope things will improve, rather 
than expectations. For more detail see: http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/afghani-
stan/100118/afghanistan -opinion -poll. A 2009 survey by the Asia Foundation also found Afghans 
to be growing more optimistic, but by a smaller margin. That survey can be seen at: http://
asiafoundation.org/resources/pdfs/2009AGpollKeyFindingsFinAL.pdf. A 2009 survey by the 
same ABc/BBc/ARd conglomerate tracked dropping confidence levels. That data is found at: 
http://abcnews.go.com/images/PollingUnit/1083a1Afghanistan2009.pdf. 
 6 Six in 10 Afghans view the work of the US and the nATO coalition poorly, according to the 
ABC News poll, although that reflects a 10 percent improvement over last year’s rate. Meanwhi-
le, 64 percent of the Pakistani public regards the US as an enemy, according to an August 2009 
Pew survey, while only nine percent describe it as a partner. The Pew Survey is available at: 
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?Reportid=265. 
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Examining Motives: The Greed and Grievance Factors 
Over the past decade, a growing body of academic literature has examined the 
role that organized crime has played in recent cases of insurgency and civil conflict, 
probing the various ways in which involvement in crime can alter the trajectory of 
belligerent groups, and considering the most effective countermeasures that gover-
nments and military planners can adopt in order to counter the phenomenon. 
There has been lively debate over the question of whether greed or grievance is 
more often the predicator of violence in such conflicts.7 This paper does not aim to 
determine whether greed, grievance, nor some combination thereof sparked the 
post 2001 rebellion in Afghanistan. Rather, it is useful to consider the role that 
greed and grievance now play in affecting the insurgency’s staying power. in a 
region where a broad range of actors profit from the drug trade and other illicit 
activities, there is no question that reducing levels of organized crime will be es-
sential to rebuilding the Afghan state, improving governance, reviving licit econo-
mies and ensuring tax revenues enter federal coffers in both Pakistan and Afgha-
nistan. The prevalence of organized crime, and the extent to which militant groups 
appear to be deepening their involvement in it, also suggests that certain factions 
and key leaders of the insurgency may be motivated more by profit – or in other 
words greed – than the political grievances for which they claim to fight. 
no doubt the Taliban have capitalized on political, ethnic and economic grie-
vances of members of the local community, and there is scant evidence that rank-
-and -file Taliban take up arms simply to enrich themselves, nor that they earn much 
once they do. At the same time, however, there is clear evidence that the continued 
state of insecurity richly benefits a small number of elites on both sides of the 
battlefield, giving both corrupt state actors and militant leaders a clear financial 
incentive to sustain disorder, regardless of whether their wider political and other 
goals have been achieved. For military planners, troops in the field, diplomats and 
others engaged in the effort to negotiate solutions to the conflict, it will be useful 
to assess which actors are motivated primarily or exclusively by profit, and which 
engage in crime as a means to further their political and ideological goals. 
no doubt there will be a blend of motivations in some cases. Understanding 
them – and their relative weight in each case – will assist in making decisions about 
 7 See for example Paul collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002). “Greed and Grievance in civil War,” 
Berkeley Electronic Press. collier and Hoeffler (1998). “On economic causes of civil War,” Oxford 
Economic Papers, volume 50, n.º 4. Mats Berdal and david M. Malone (eds) (2000). Greed and 
Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
The Taliban and Organized crime
Nação e Defesa 112
how to co -opt power brokers, or whether to remove them from the playing field 
instead. Licit financial alternatives may prompt those motivated predominantly by 
avarice to put down their weapons.8 People predominantly motivated by grievan-
ces about how their society is run or how they are treated will hold out until their 
political goals are met. Judging how to read key players, while simultaneously 
making efforts to improve the lot of ordinary civilians, could support stability 
operations. The interplay of greed and political grievance exists on both sides of 
the battlefield. Regional power brokers, warlords and corrupt state actors also 
protect and engage in illicit activities, and state corruption facilitates and strengthens 
organized crime generally. 
Afghanistan is not the first conflict zone where organized crime has become a 
major destabilizing factor, and yet the wider phenomenon has received scant at-
tention among military strategists in this and other recent conflicts. Wartime un-
derground networks in Bosnia, for example, morphed into political criminal networks 
that were tied to smuggling, tax evasion, and human trafficking, according to a 
2000 US government study (US General Accounting Office, 2000). Ties between the 
Kosovo Liberation Army and Balkan smuggling networks also slowed efforts to 
stabilize Kosovo.9 in a more recent case, organized crime in post -Ba’athist iraq be-
came the “unrecognized joker in the pack,” funding al -Qa’ida, Jaish -al -Mahdi as well 
as a number of Sunni tribes that initially fought US forces (Williams, 2009). There 
is good reason to give this issue close attention in Afghanistan: A 2002 Stanford 
University study that analyzed 122 civil wars since 1945 found that conflicts in 
which the actors engaged in organized crime lasted five times longer than the rest 
on average (Fearon, 2002: 13). 
information presented in this report has been compiled mainly from interviewing 
Afghans in insurgent -affected areas in order to gauge their perceptions of how their 
communities are victimized by insurgent criminal activity. There are advantages 
and drawbacks to field -based research in a conflict zone, and there are particular 
challenges associated with the Afghanistan -Pakistan border areas, many parts of 
which are inaccessible to foreign and local researchers alike. Members of the com-
 8 See Richard Snyder (2004). “does Lootable Wealth Breed disorder,” June, pp. 17 -20, for an analy-
sis of how the military regime in Burma co -opted rebels who profited from the opium trade 
there, investing their narco -profits into legitimate businesses. As Snyder points out, this tactic 
succeeded in reducing levels of disorder but did nothing to reduce drug trafficking. Within the 
Afghan conflict, a number of power brokers tied to poppy cultivation and organized crime have 
agreed to change their ways in return for development aid and other support. There may be 
significant numbers of cases where co -option is a better alternative than interdiction. 
 9 For more detail see United nations Office of drugs and crime (2008). Crime and its Impact on 
the Balkans and Affected Countries, March.Available at http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-
-and -analysis/Balkan_study.pdf 
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munity are able to provide a level of immediacy and intimacy that few outsiders 
would be able to attain on their own, but reliance on their largely anecdotal infor-
mation also makes the data presented herein harder to corroborate. complicating 
matters further, examining illicit activity is a challenging prospect in any environ-
ment, since most crime goes unreported and criminal actors tend to lie. There is 
no way to compensate for these issues entirely, but each case presented in this 
report has been corroborated by Afghan and Western officials, the media and other 
open source reporting, or was recounted by enough sources to be considered ge-
nerally accurate. The US Military shared with the author a raft of declassified 
documents seized in Afghanistan, which also served to corroborate local reporting.
A Kinder, Gentler Taliban?
in 2009, the Quetta Shura Taliban named new regional commanders and shuffled 
the lineup of its executive council. The QST also issued a new code of conduct in 
an apparent attempt to exert control over unruly Taliban sub -commanders, make 
strategic preparations for the surge of US troops, and improve relations with ordi-
nary Afghans by establishing a civilian shadow government at the local level. 
Under the new structure, the Taliban broadened its shadow government and esta-
blished provincial -level commissions where Afghans can present their requests or 
complaints to a local council of religious scholars, who answer back to the Shura.10 
“The reason they changed their tactics is that they want to prepare for a long -term 
fight, and for that they need support from the people; they need local sources of 
income,” said Wahid Mujda, a former Taliban official who now tracks the insurgency 
on the internet (Rubin, 2010).
The Taliban code of conduct broadly paralleled US -led efforts to reshape nATO 
strategy in Afghanistan.11 Mullah Mohammed Omar, the leader of the Quetta Shura 
Taliban (QST) ordered his commanders to avoid victimizing locals in what could 
10 The Quetta Shura is so named because the Taliban leadership is widely believed to take opera-
te from the western Pakistani city of Quetta, in Baluchistan province. in recent months, there 
have been open source reports suggesting that the Taliban leadership has shifted to the southern 
port city Karachi out of fear that an intensive US -led drone campaign in the FATA would be 
extended to Baluchistan to target QST leaders. See for example: imtiaz Ali (2010). “Karachi 
Becoming a Taliban Safe Haven?”. CTC Sentinel, January, p. 13. The QST number two, Mullah 
Baradar, was captured in Karachi in February 2010, followed shortly thereafter by as many as 
four other Taliban officials in other parts of the country.
11 in his 60 -page initial assessment to defense Secretary Robert Gates, Lt. Gen. Stanley Mcchrys-
tal wrote that, “Our objective must be the population.” A redacted version of the assessment 
is available at http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp -srv/politics/documents/Assessment_Re-
dacted_092109.pdf
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be seen as a population -centric approach, Taliban style. These efforts were under-
mined by an increase in suicide bombings, improvised explosive device (ied) 
attacks and targeted killings by insurgents to which the United nations attributed 
67 percent of the civilian deaths in Afghanistan in 2009, or twice the number of 
civilian deaths attributed to the coalition and their Afghan government allies. 12 
in addition to attempting to reduce levels of violence against civilians, the 
strategy embodied in the Taliban’s new code of conduct also centralizes power in 
the Taliban’s 10 -man ruling council, or Shura Majlis (referred to as the Quetta Shura), 
and permits lower -ranking insurgents fewer opportunities to earn money at the 
ground level. The code of conduct decreed that no one outside the Quetta Shura 
had the power to alter the new regulations, and listed the “provincial, district, and 
central military commissions [as] responsible for the dissemination and implemen-
tation of these rules.”13 
Various chapters of the decree appear aimed at limiting local commanders from 
taking their own decisions or earning funds at the local level, instead ceding all 
authority to the provincial commissions and the Taliban supreme leadership. Most 
significantly, the new system streamlines the way in which money raised by the 
Taliban at the local level is funneled back to the Pakistan -based QST leadership, in 
some cases bypassing the local Taliban commander entirely. Although the February 
and March 2010 arrests of key Taliban officials in Pakistan raises the possibility that 
the QST shadow government could be significantly disrupted, its influence and 
reach did spread dramatically in 2008 and 2009, with some 80 percent of Afghanis-
tan witnessing at least some insurgent activity and as much as one -third of the 
country under tight Taliban control for much of 2009.14 
Mullah Mohammad Omar, the reclusive one -eyed founder of the movement, 
has remained the Amir -ul -Momineen, or supreme leader of the Afghan Taliban 
movement.15 He named his trusted lieutenant Mullah Baradar, who also chaired 
the Shura, to oversee the implementation of his 2009 code, and to appoint mi-
litary commanders and provincial shadow governors.16 Baradar’s February 2010 
12 A January 2010 report by the U.n. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan said the Taliban killed 
2.73 times more civilians in 2009 than pro -government forces. UnAMA blamed Taliban insur-
gents for 1,630 civilian deaths (67 percent of the total recorded deaths) in 2009 – a 41 percent 
increase on 2008, when 1,160 deaths, or 54 percent, were attributed to the insurgents. For details 
see: http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?Reportid=87716. 
13 An english -language translation of the code can be found at www.opensource.gov. 
14 Personal interview by author with david Kilcullen, an advisor to LG Mcchrystal, October 27, 
2009. 
15 Amir -ul -Momineen literally translates “commander of the Faithful.”
16 Personal interviews by research assistant, Kabul August 2009 and see: Ron Moreau (2009). 
“America’s new nightmare”. Newsweek, July 25.
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capture in Pakistan, followed by the arrests of as many as four other QST offi-
cials, would appear to corroborate claims that Baradar oversaw the shadow 
leadership. 
Another significant capture was that of Mullah Agha Jan Mutassim, a key Ta-
liban strategist who, until his March 2010 arrest, chaired the powerful finance 
committee.17 Afghan security and intelligence officials say Mutassim, a native of 
Panjway, convinced Mullah Omar of the need to reduce the financial exploitation 
of the local population by Taliban fighters, arguing that the insurgents risked losing 
their support. Afghan officials and tribal sources close to the Taliban say Mutassim 
also convinced Mullah Omar that internecine fighting between Taliban sub-
-commanders, particularly over money and resources, had become detrimental to 
the overall strength and unity of the movement.18 Apparently, Mutassim feared a 
return of the kind of violence that occurred in the early 1990s, when rival mujahidin 
commanders turned their guns on each other and terrorized local communities 
across southern Afghanistan after the departure of Soviet forces.19 Perhaps even 
more significantly, Mutassim implemented a series of reforms (discussed in greater 
detail below) that streamline how funds collected at the local level reach the Taliban’s 
central coffers. “He is like the Ashraf Ghani of the Taliban,” said an Afghan official 
who tracks the Taliban leadership, referring to the former Afghan finance minister 
who ran for president on a campaign to stamp out graft and who was instrumen-
tal, until he resigned from the Karzai government in 2004, in increasing the amount 
of tax revenue collected provincially that reached Kabul.20 
The establishment of the provincial -level commissions represents another way 
in which the Taliban leadership seemed to be trying to reach out to civilians in 2009, 
in particular since the commissions were often headed by religious clerics, not just 
Taliban commanders. civilians could go to the Taliban’s shadow Sharia court system 
in order to settle local disputes, or could take their complaints to the commissions, 
which also dispensed justice. in particular, the provincial -level commissions beca-
me a venue where ordinary Afghans and local businessmen could file a complaint 
the local Taliban forces. The Taliban’s willingness to punish their own is one of the 
main reasons many Afghans view the QST insurgents as being more fair – even if 
strict and ruthless – than the notoriously corrupt Afghan government. The 2009 
code decreed that Taliban “who commit crimes should be referred to the provincial 
17 Personal interviews with Afghan officials by research assistant, Kabul July 2009. 
18 Personal interviews with Afghan officials by research assistants, Kabul and Kandahar July 2009. 
19 Personal interviews with Afghan officials by research assistants, Kabul and Kandahar July 2009. 
20 Personal interview with Afghan official by research assistant, Kabul July 2009.
The Taliban and Organized crime
Nação e Defesa 116
commission,” which had the right, along with the shadow governor, “to expel the 
perpetrator or to accept if the person repents.” As explained by a tribal elder in 
Ghazni: “They have been going to people in the mosques and saying any Taliban 
member who shows a sudden increase in wealth has to explain it.” He gave the 
example of Qari Wali, a Taliban sub -commander who suddenly showed up with a 
Toyota corolla outside of Ghazni city. “The commission took his car. He was sus-
pended, and he had to explain how they got the car,” said the elder. it turned out 
that Wali had agreed to kidnap a member of a rival tribe, using his 20 -man fighting 
unit to carry out the abduction. The Taliban leadership responded by taking away 
his command, and reassigning Wali to Helmand province.21 
in at least one reported case the Taliban commission in Helmand even castigated 
a judge in Musa Qala whom the Taliban had appointed. “One judge was found 
taking a bribe and the Taliban put black all over his face and tied him to a tree,” 
recounted businessman eitadullah Khan (Gannon, 2009). “When he was released, 
he was fired.” (Gannon, 2009). Afghans interviewed for this paper in various parts 
of the country described the Taliban courts and commissions as impartial and less 
corrupt than the state justice system. Others, however, insisted that they used the 
Taliban justice system out of fear, apparently worried about the potential conse-
quences of local Taliban finding they had turned to the local government.
The Provincial commissions issued decrees using the stamp of the islamic 
emirate of Afghanistan, the official title of the Taliban government.22 They also 
helped the Quetta Shura maintain control over funds raised at and dispatched to 
the provinces. each commission had a political and economic committee, according 
to locals who dealt with them, and each received a set budget, decided by and 
negotiable with the Quetta Shura. Wardak Province, for example, received a budget 
of about US$36,000 while more active combat zones like Ghazni and Zabul received 
as much as US$107,000 monthly.23 The commission controlled how money was 
earned at the village level in each province, but the Quetta leadership appeared to 
shuffle commission members on a frequent basis, apparently to prevent any one 
individual or group from becoming too powerful. 
21 interview by research assistant, Ghazni, August 2009.
22 Personal interviews with Afghan officials by research assistant, Kabul July 2009.
23 interview with a senior interior Ministry official in Kabul who has seen intercepted Taliban 
documents noting the quantities by research assistant, Kabul, August 2009. This information 
was corroborated in part by an Afghan military intelligence official in Ghazni who confirmed 
that Taliban commanders in his zone were receiving budgets worth millions of PKR monthly 
and by a provincial official of the ndS, who confirmed the PKR3 million budget for Wardak 
province. 
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The QST also attempted to end Taliban sub -commanders bickering among the-
mselves over operational issues. An Afghan national Police officer who was ab-
ducted within the last year by Taliban fighters in Paghman province recalled three 
Taliban sub -commanders arguing over his fate. One wanted to ask a ransom from 
the policeman’s family and commander, and pocket the money. A second comman-
der had a cousin jailed in Pul -e -Charki prison outside Kabul, and wanted to try and 
trade the police officer for his relative. A third just wanted to kill the policeman 
simply because he worked for the Kabul government. in the end, the police official 
said, the provincial commission decided his fate and he was eventually freed for a 
ransom payment.24 
Both in terms of financial matters and political decisions, the Taliban appeared 
in 2009 to be trying to centralize the decision -making process. While it is too early 
to draw firm conclusions, there are indications the effort may have backfired in 
some areas. Mullah Omar purged a number of commanders, most notably Manso-
or dadullah, who were not following orders sent down by the senior leadership, 
and – according to some sources – for skimming money meant to be sent to 
Quetta.25 A spokesman for the Taliban called the media in late 2007 to announce that 
Mansoor dadullah, who had assumed many of Mullah dadullah’s responsibilities, 
had been fired “because he disobeyed orders of the islamic emirate.” (Agence 
France Press, 2007). Researchers for this paper heard of multiple cases where QST 
commanders across the south were disciplined, demoted and shifted to new regions, 
or even pushed out of the group entirely. in some zones, the Taliban also distanced 
themselves from local criminal gangs during 2009, although locals and government 
officials alike say that insurgents continued to subcontract local criminal gangs as 
needed in regions where the insurgents were less dominant or where they were 
attempting to establish wider control. 
efforts to reshuffle Taliban commanders and impose more control over their 
ability to earn funds independently may have partially backfired for the QST lea-
dership, possibly exposing a strategic weakness for the organization. Sources close 
to the movement told researchers that some QST commanders had rebelled against 
efforts to rein them in, sometimes violently. in a december 2009 Kabul press con-
ference, Afghanistan’s national Security council appeared to corroborate at least 
one report, saying the Kabul government had received intelligence indicating that 
Mullah Omar had sacked two more Taliban commanders in the poppy -rich districts 
of Arghandab in Kandahar and Gereshk in Helmand. Jamil Bahrami, director of 
24 interview by research assistant, Paghman, August 2009. 
25 interview by research assistant, Kabul, August 2009.
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strategy at the national Security council said some of the command changes “have 
triggered differences and oppositions among local Taliban commanders,” according 
to a local news report (Arman -e Melli, 2009). The possibility that QST commanders 
were resisting or even revolting against efforts to cut them off from local funding 
sources would not only indicate those specific commanders were more driven by 
profit motives than ideology, but that the new streamlined system may have thre-
atened, rather than strengthened, the Shura’s control over its network. 
certain passages in the new code of conduct suggested that Mullah Omar 
wanted to reduce the ways in which fighters under his command victimized ordi-
nary Afghans. “The mujahidin should strive to win the hearts and minds of Musli-
ms by treating them with justice and good faith,” it said. “As representatives of the 
islamic emirates, the mujahidin should present themselves in such a manner that 
the whole nation would welcome and cooperate with them.” The code, which was 
spottily enforced, banned Taliban soldiers from “forcefully collecting alms, donations, 
and ushr,” an agricultural tithe that the Taliban levy on farmers. it also warned its 
fighters not to enter people’s homes without permission and instructed them to do 
“their best to avoid civilian casualties and refrain from inflicting damage on peoples’ 
vehicle and property.” Only Taliban -appointed judges could settle local disputes, 
the code dictated, calling their rulings final. it forbade kidnapping for ransom, 
saying that: “criminals who kidnap in the name of the islamic emirate should be 
disarmed and introduced to the leadership.” Additionally, the decree banned Tali-
ban fighters from smoking and from keeping young boys, traditionally exploited 
for sex, on their bases.
The release of the code was accompanied by a Taliban propaganda campaign 
that also appeared to direct insurgent fighters not to victimize the local population. 
According to Afghans who saw the message on the now defunct Taliban website, 
Shahamat, a statement by Mullah Mutassim advised Taliban forces not to attack 
schools, clinics, bridges and roads. it also directed commanders not to harass peo-
ple on the highways. Meanwhile, Mullah Abdul Manan niazi, the Taliban comman-
der along the Kabul -Kandahar Highway, reportedly ordered his fighters to stop 
damaging bridges and collecting “tolls” on the busy interstate. in one 2009 messa-
ge he urged insurgent fighters “to make sure there was no distance between the 
people and the Taliban.” According to locals interviewed for this paper who heard 
the broadcast, his radio message went onto say that if the Taliban accepted bribes, 
“then there will be no difference between us and the police.”26 
26 interview by research assistant, Kabul, August 2009.
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despite such lofty statements, however, it’s important to recognize that the 
Taliban was not been entirely successful in implementing its new of code of 
conduct, nor entirely innocent on the charge of attacking civilians any more, 
indeed, than the coalition has been. Many Afghans continued to face – or at least 
perceive – a tangible level of threat if they did not abide by Taliban decrees. The-
re seemed to be no let up whatsoever, for example, in the vicious punishments 
handed out by the insurgents, with locals in the south saying QST commanders 
continued to hold public executions of anyone suspected of “spying” for the 
coalition.27 “People cooperate with the Taliban out of fear,” said Abdul Ghani, 
director of the Afghan national Police’s anti -terrorism department in Ghazni 
province. “if the Taliban sense the slightest whiff of espionage by local individu-
als, they instantly kill those people without any mercy.”28 When US Marines 
pushed into Mian Posteh in Helmand province, villagers initially refused to re-
-enter the bazaar the American troops cleared, saying the Taliban had threatened 
to chop off their heads if they did. “There are Taliban everywhere,” village elder 
Haji Fada Mohammed told the Marines. “if i tell you who they are, i will be in 
danger.” (Tyson, 2009).
The code of conduct also instructed field commanders on money matters, 
institutionalizing how profits earned from organized crime were to be shared 
within the command chain. The code specified that Taliban soldiers were permit-
ted to keep up to 80 percent of whatever “booty” they captured from “an infidel 
combatant” or coalition base, but one -fifth of the value or property seized must 
be transferred to the shadow provincial governor. The code permitted Taliban 
fighters to attack and destroy coalition vehicles and convoys, but said capturing 
and then “releasing them in exchange for money is forbidden.” it decreed that 
any cash captured from the nATO coalition or the Karzai government must be 
transferred in its entirety to the Taliban treasury. The code also regulated shake-
downs and extortion fees, banning provincial or district -level Taliban commanders 
from directly making deals with local businesses and companies. “disputes on 
issues related to businesses and companies should be referred to the leadership,” 
the code stated. This would suggest the QST was evolving into an organization 
that openly functioned like a traditional mafia, with a strict code governing illicit 
earnings, and where the leaders have final say in all matters of collecting protec-
tion money. it also indicated a much higher level of internal discipline than the 
Afghan government could maintain. 
27 Personal interviews by research assistant, Lashkar Gah, Kandahar. July 2009.
28 Personal interview, by research assistant, Ghazni July 2009. 
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The code of conduct laid down strict new rules concerning the treatment of 
prisoners, moving to limit Taliban fighters from accepting ransom payments on 
their own and stating that: “it is strictly forbidden to free coalition prisoners in 
exchange for money.” The same went for contractors working with the coalition. 
The authority to execute, trade, or set free foreign prisoners in exchange for money 
came to rest entirely with Mullah Omar and his deputy, who had to personally 
approve the circumstances. The code additionally banned Taliban fighters from 
torturing prisoners, beheading or dismembering them, but stated that obtaining 
confession through promises of “money or position” was acceptable, as long as the 
insurgents were able to deliver on their promises. it banned “cash payment” as a 
form of disciplinary punishment and prevented sub -commanders from killing local 
government officials who offer to lay down their arms and not support the gover-
nment. it also forbade Taliban commanders from taking on new fighters without 
prior consent of the insurgent leadership. The code of conduct thus struggled to 
reconcile competing priorities. On the one hand the Taliban claimed they wanted 
to improve relations with the local community, but the code explicitly permitted 
and regulated violent criminal activities that continue to harm civilians.
Taliban Moving up the Opium Value Chain 
declining farm prices apparently motivated Taliban commanders to move up 
the value chain of the drug trade, shifting their focus from taxing farm output to 
the more lucrative processing and exporting end of the business. “To separate the 
drug smugglers from the insurgency in the south is now almost impossible,” said 
a US officer who closely tracks the opium trade.29 The smuggling rings collaborating 
with the insurgency operate from Pakistan, by and large out of reach of the coalition. 
in addition to their close ties to the Taliban, major traffickers pay off key government 
officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan and iran, greatly complicating efforts to interdict 
them with the help of local security forces. 
The smuggling group previously run by Haji Juma Khan has been the dominant 
trafficking organization since 2005 in Helmand province, where more than half of 
Afghanistan’s poppy crop is cultivated. Khan ran a major opium market out of 
Marjah, a town in the Helmand River floodplains just 17 miles southwest of the 
provincial capital Lashkar Ghah where coalition forces in February 2010 launched 
29 Personal telephone interview by author, September 2009. 
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a major operation to clear out the Taliban. He also maintained multi -ton storage 
depots and drug refineries in Baram chah, a dusty outpost that straddles the 
Afghan -Pakistan border. despite the kingpin’s arrest in October 2008 in indonesia, 
from where he was swiftly extradited to the United States, the organization appe-
ars to have continued functioning without interruption under the command of 
Khan’s nephew and former chief of operations, Haji Hafiz Akhtar.30 The immense 
scale of the group’s operations – and their close ties to the Taliban – became clear 
in May 2009, when nATO and Afghan troops launched an operation to disrupt 
militants in Marjah suspected of plotting to assassinate the Helmand governor.31 
After three days of intensive fighting, 60 Taliban lay dead and the coalition had 
seized a staggering 92 metric tons of heroin, opium, hashish and poppy seeds, as 
well as hundreds of gallons of precursor chemicals, making it the second largest 
drug haul in global history. indicating how closely opium merchants and insurgents 
now work, the market also housed a Taliban command center, complete with ela-
borate communications systems, suicide vests and a large weapons cache.32 
Reliable local media reports have also indicated that due to the declining farm-
-gate price of raw opium, there has been a significant increase of refineries inside 
Taliban -held regions of Afghanistan capable of refining opium into crystal heroin, 
the high -value and most potent version of the drug. One lab worker in Marjah 
claimed there were more than 100 refineries operating in the district before the 
February 2010 offensive took place (Tassal, 2010). Separately, Western counternar-
cotics officials told Time Magazine there was evidence that traffickers operating 
there had packed up and fled with their goods before the February 2010 nATO 
operation began. Prior to the offensive, a squad of American and Afghan parami-
litary troops raided a major opium bazaar, finding shop after shop stacked to the 
ceiling with bundles of opium, heroin, hashish, guns and improvised explosive 
devices used in roadside bombings. “if anybody needed proof that there was a 
nexus between the Taliban and drug traffickers, this was it,” said a Western counter-
-narcotics agent in Kabul (McGirk, 2010). not only do Taliban commanders increa-
singly take on the role of running or managing heroin labs, but local and western 
official sources say there are indications that Taliban forces are increasingly getting 
30 Personal interview by author with US military official October 2009. 
31 For a detailed account of the offensive, confirmed by military officials who took part in it, see: 
“Afghanistan’s narco -War,” a report to the committee on Foreign Relations, US Senate, August 
10, 2009, p. 19. Available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi -bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_
cong_senate_committee_prints&docid=f:51521.pdf. 
32 Personal interviews by author and Heidi Vogt (2009). “Troops Make Large drug Seizure in 
Afghanistan,” Associated Press, May 23.
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into the business of moving drug shipments across Afghanistan’s border into Pakis-
tan and iran, where the wholesale value of drugs more than doubles.33 The shift in 
focus from farm -level taxation to the processing and exporting end of the drug 
trade indicates that the QST is increasingly taking on the characteristics of a drug 
trafficking organization itself, capable of purchasing locally, refining and then ex-
porting narcotics. 
Two other seizures in 2009 in southern Afghanistan indicate that the QST and 
the traffickers have developed and sustained a sophisticated supply chain for both 
drugs and explosives, despite the increased foreign troop presence and the lack of 
basic infrastructure in the south. An October 2009 drug raid on another Taliban 
base, also in Helmand, recovered 45 metric tons of opium, along with a stunning 
1.8 metric tons of processed heroin, according to a press release from the Afghan 
defense Ministry (Associated Press, 2009). The heroin alone would have been wor-
th $4.3 million on the local wholesale market, and more than double that if smuggled 
across the border into Pakistan or iran.34 And while there appears to be a shortage 
of military grade explosives among the insurgents, militants in the south have 
increasingly come to rely on fertilizer products, mainly ammonium nitrate, that can 
be mixed into explosives. coalition troops in Kandahar in november 2009 seized 
an astonishing half -million pounds of ammonium nitrate from a Taliban base, in-
dicating that they maintained a steady supply of chemicals that could be used to 
make bombs (Filkins, 2009). About 2,000 bomb -making devices like timers and 
triggers were also found at the insurgent hideout, indicating the fertilizer was not 
for farm use (Filkins, 2009).
A steady increase in seizures of refined heroin, according to coalition officials 
and the deA, indicates that more and more drug labs are capable of processing 
raw opium into crystal heroin, the most potent and high -value grade of the drug. 
The number of refineries south of the bend in the Helmand River (Garimser and 
deshu districts) has reportedly climbed in recent years, although officials say it is 
hard to determine a precise number since the operations have become smaller and 
more mobile. increasingly, according to US and Afghan officials, there are reports 
of Taliban commanders running their own drug labs, something almost unheard of 
just three years ago, and controlling drug shipments beyond the Afghan border 
into western Pakistan.35 Because the labs are increasingly mobile and operate in 
33 Multiple interviews by author and research assistants with US, Afghan and Pakistani officials. 
34 Using figures from the UnOdc’s 2009 World drug Report. Available at http://www.unodc.
org/documents/wdr/WdR_2009/WdR2009_Statistical_annex_prices.pdf. 
35 Personal interviews by author, Washington dc. 
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Taliban -dominated zones, it is difficult to assess how much control the Quetta lea-
dership maintains over taxes collected at the refineries. 
Village -level Taliban sub -commanders do not just tax poppy crops. They collect 
a portion of all farm output, whether licit or illicit, usually in the range of 10 percent, 
but negotiable depending on the wealth of the farmer and the level of influence the 
Taliban commands in a given area. Poor farmers tell of handing the local Taliban 
sub -commander as little as a bag of fruit from their annual harvest, and there were 
also reports that large landowners had to pay a significantly higher agricultural tithe, 
as much as 20 percent in certain districts of Farah province, for example. in some 
villages, the Taliban sub -commander has to split what he collects 50/50 with the 
local Mullah or village chief, and in most zones, he must send 10 percent of his take 
to his provincial -level commander. When village -level sub -commanders collect a 
commodity for which they and their troops have no use, they will often sell it to a 
local broker. Although this practice is not universal, in some areas the Taliban have 
begun handing out tax receipts to ensure that villagers and shopkeepers are not 
charged more than once. This practice has been implemented in northern Kunduz 
province, where the QST has made significant inroads in the past year.36
Shopkeepers and other small businesses, including pharmacies, teashops and 
automotive repair stations, are also required to hand over a portion of their monthly 
proceeds to the Taliban – usually in the range of 10 percent, although also dependent 
on total earnings. in some cases, Taliban will ask the shopkeepers for supplies in 
place of money. One grocer in Ghazni described having to supply local insurgents 
with cooking oil and rice in lieu of a monthly payment, and said he received a re-
ceipt.37 Because the Taliban depend on communications, and change their phones 
regularly to avoid surveillance, the local shopkeeper who sells mobile phone handsets, 
top up cards for airtime credit and phone chips is likely to be visited routinely by 
the local Taliban unit, researchers for this paper found. Shopkeepers also reported 
that Taliban who have looted goods or confiscated them from trucks re -sell the com-
modities for money. “They will call up and say, we have some telephones or gene-
rators or whatever, if you want to buy them,” said a local businessman.38 Shopkeepers 
interviewed for this report also described having to on -pass messages for the Taliban 
as they moved through town. Some claimed they did not want to serve as messengers, 
but feared the consequences of not helping the insurgents. 
36 information for this paragraph was compiled by various researchers across Afghanistan in July 
and August 2009. 
37 Personal interview by research assistant, Ghazni, August 2009. 
38 Telephone interview by author, november 2009. 
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Although QST sub -commanders continue to “tax” farmers and small -time bu-
sinesses at the local level, there is also evidence that the Shura Majlis has moved to 
regulate how protection money is collected from larger businesses, aid and deve-
lopment projects, as well as the trucking firms that operate on the busy Kandahar-
-Quetta corridor and other southern highways. A half -dozen truck drivers and the 
owners of two large trucking firms interviewed for this paper said that QST forces 
in the south no longer collect payments on the Quetta -Kandahar highway, for 
example. instead, under a system Mutassim developed, trucking firms now must 
deposit protection payments with specified moneychangers in Quetta and Kandahar. 
The moneychangers record the license plate numbers of the trucks, and details 
about what cargo they will carry, and the money is handed over directly to the 
Financial council.39 drivers reported receiving a code that they could give if armed 
men stopped them on the road. “The tiger is wounded but alive,” was a code one 
driver gave as an example.
Trucks carrying goods for the local market, or transiting across Afghanistan, can 
expect to pay about 10 percent of the value of their shipment. convoys carrying 
goods for the coalition get charged a higher rate, which can range from 25 to 40 
percent of the total value being carried, according to truckers and officials at tru-
cking firms.40 A member of the Achakzai tribe, which has long dominated the 
transport business on the Quetta -Kandahar route, said he paid the Taliban between 
US$95,000 and US$130,000 every six months to protect convoys he sends to supply 
the Kandahar Air Field. “This is very organized between the [Taliban] fighters and 
the Shura,” he said. “You give the name of the driver and the license plate, and 
your truck is safe.” Low -ranking Taliban who ply the roads between Kandahar and 
the Pakistan border continue to hit up passenger cars for protection payments, but 
the large sums now go direct to Quetta.41 
The Afghan Taliban appear to rely on an elaborate network of informants – the 
so -called village underground – to help them determine how much they can char-
ge each trucking firm (as well as families, businesses and aid groups) they target. 
The informants get paid off for the information they provide, and local sources say 
they believe bus and taxi drivers and merchants who have excuses for leaving the 
village on a regular basis are routinely part of the information network. Those 
39 Personal interviews by research assistants in Kabul and Kandahar, August 2009.
40 Personal interview by research assistant, Kandahar, August 2009.
41 So far, this system seems to operate only in Kandahar and Helmand. in other parts of Afgha-
nistan where there is a mix of insurgent factions and criminal gangs, truckers can expect to be 
hit up for cash on the roads.
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trucking firms who try and avoid paying the Taliban end up paying a higher price. 
One trucker in Kandahar recalled the story of a trader who imported spare parts 
from Pakistan, and who made the mistake of bragging in a teashop at the border 
that he didn’t plan to pay off the insurgents. His four vehicles barely made it out-
side the government -controlled border town of Spin Boldak before Taliban gunmen 
overtook the convoy, and it cost him close to US$200,000 to buy his equipment 
back.42 it’s not always clear if such tales are actually true. What’s more important 
is that they are widely believed among the trucking community, which is therefo-
re persuaded not to take chances. There has been documented evidence that the 
Taliban has tried to regularize their tax collection system. in 2009, the Taliban in 
Helmand issued their local representative with a notice ‘to all Kajaki shopkeepers 
and truck drivers’: ‘The bearer of this letter is our new representative. Please coo-
perate with him like ever before.’43 
The Quetta Shura also collects protection money from larger businesses, notably 
the telecoms sector, and construction projects funded by international aid organi-
zations and the coalition. Sargon Heinrich, a Kabul -based businessman in cons-
truction and service industries was quoted in a September 2009 Time Magazine 
report as saying that 16 percent of his gross revenue went to paying ‘facilitation 
fees’, mostly to protect shipments of valuable equipment coming from the border 
(Baker, 2009). The report aptly describes the circular nature of the problem: the US 
government provides money to local contractors to build roads, schools and brid-
ges as part of the counterinsurgency campaign, but the contractors must pay off 
insurgents to avoid having those projects attacked. The insurgents then spend the 
money they raise to purchase weapons and explosives, which in turn get used to 
kill American soldiers. “it becomes a self -sustaining war,” says an adviser to the 
Afghan Ministry of interior, “a self -licking ice cream.” (Baker, 2009).
in parts of the country where there is little or no poppy grown, especially in 
districts where there is major construction work or central roadways pass through, 
extortion is believed to be the largest source of income for the insurgents. This 
creates a moral hazard for the international community, which seeks to stabilize 
Afghanistan but inadvertently ends up financing the insurgency and the explosives 
rebels use to kill western troops and Afghan civilians. The US Agency for interna-
tional development has opened an investigation into allegations that its funds for 
road and bridge construction in Afghanistan are ending up in the hands of the 
Taliban, with congress set to hold hearings on the issue (MacKenzie, 2009). it will 
42 Personal interview by research assistant, Kandahar, August 2009.
43 This document was given to the author by the US military and a scan of it can be viewed on 
the combating Terrorism center’s website, www.ctc.usma.edu.
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be challenging to investigate the problem since few contracting firms admit to 
making security payments in the first place. How to stop the phenomenon – and 
provide adequate protection for development projects around the country – is yet 
another challenge altogether. 
The Taliban also targets Afghanistan’s mobile phone network. The four main 
Afghan telecoms firms, which service about two million subscribers between them, 
must pay monthly protection fees in each province, or face having their transmis-
sion towers attacked. Payments are usually in the range of US$2,000 dollars per 
tower, per month, but it depends on who controls the zone around each tower. “in 
the Taliban areas, you have to deal with their commissions,” said a local business-
man whose firm builds transmission towers, who estimates about a quarter of his 
company’s budget goes to protection fees on the roads and at building sites. ‘Most 
of them, they act just like businessmen in a way. They tell you: “We will make sure 
your people are not kidnapped and your sites are not burned.” But they expect 
regular payments.’ However, he said in Helmand and Kandahar, the QST had es-
tablished a new system in which payments must go direct to Quetta. The busines-
sman routinely sends a representative to Pakistan to pay off the Taliban leadership, 
he said, rather than dealing with the district -level commander. 
Protecting Civilians from Crime will Enhance Rule of Law
When US forces first arrived in Afghanistan in 2001 in the wake of the September 
11 attacks, few military planners, policy -makers and intelligence analysts ever ima-
gined the extent to which organized crime – and specifically the heroin trade – would 
dramatically aggravate, prolong and reshape the conflict there. The spread of orga-
nized crime on both sides of the Afghanistan -Pakistan border, and among various 
factions of the insurgency, highlights the need for a holistic strategy in such environ-
ments that works simultaneously to foster security, development and the rule of law.
evidence presented in this paper suggests that the QST is at once trying to re-
gulate and restrain the behavior of its commanders, and that that effort has as much 
to do with streamlining illicit funds as with improving community relations. The 
Taliban seems to be taking on more characteristics of a criminal mafia group, having 
moved up the value chain of the opium trade to focus on refining and exporting 
narcotics, and expanding its activities into widespread extortion rackets. The fact 
that the insurgents are becoming increasingly criminalized should come as no 
surprise. in conflicts around the globe and throughout history, groups who engage 
in predation in order to support broad political goals often end up broadening their 
illicit activities in order to finance narrow self -interested ones. 
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The frustration and rage that ordinary civilians feel towards militant crime is 
palpable. The QST code of conduct indicates the Taliban are sensitive to widening 
public resentment and see it as a strategic liability. The coalition could take advan-
tage of this liability, which will continue as long as the Taliban remain dependent 
on profits from criminal activity. in the long run, trying to exploit the Taliban’s ties 
to organized crime will only be effective insofar as the Kabul government is per-
ceived as a preferable alternative. 
While devising strategy to reduce violence, military commanders and western 
policy -makers ought to consider the central motivations for insurgent and extremist 
leaders in this conflict. Amid international efforts to persuade the Taliban to stop 
fighting, no political concessions will be sufficient for those motivated primarily 
by greed. 
A final implication of this paper is that as much as drug trafficking and other 
organized crime have had debilitating effects on nATO’s efforts to combat militancy 
and establish stability, the spread of criminality in Afghanistan has been even more 
deleterious for ordinary civilians there. Protecting local communities from organi-
zed crime represents a still largely untapped opportunity within the wider coun-
terinsurgency strategy. if security providers (including foreign and local troops and 
police) were able and willing to provide adequate community -level security, Afghans 
would suffer far fewer shakedowns, abductions and thefts. Just as nATO soldiers 
expect relative security from crime for themselves and their families back home, 
Afghans also long for a safe atmosphere in their communities. 
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